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Somatic Concerns of Mental Health Service Users:  




Theories of affect have been offered in abundance in recent times as potential 
remedies for the many theoretical ailments that face the social sciences. Post cognitive 
theories continue to grapple with new ways of thinking the unrepentantly tricky 
relation between the psychological and socio-material. This paper will explore some 
of these avenues, before arguing that theories of affect are required that can speak to 
specificity in terms of the challenges of embodied states. Drawing on accounts of 
changing medicated body states of mental health service users the paper will develop 
a specific empirically rooted notion of affect that sympathises with the pre-personal, 
relational models of ‘excess’ prominent in affect theory, but that attempts to realise a 
theory of affect that can speak to the concrete reality of embodied experience. 
Following a theoretical path that includes Deleuze and Guattari, Brian Massumi, and 
Michel Serres, I will work towards an empirical engagement with affect that attempts 
to speak to specificity, rather than generality, as attempts at the latter can often result 
in over-tasked theories faltering in their explanatory pursuits.  
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Recent turns to affect theory have offered interesting potential avenues for thinking 
about classic ‘problems’ in the social sciences, such as the nature and relationship 
between individual and society, body and society, body and mind, across disciplines 
such as cultural studies, human geography, sociology, social psychology, gender and 
feminist studies. Efforts have been diverse in attempting to offer truly socially 
relevant and conversant conceptualisations of human experience in ever changing 
cultural and political landscapes (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Brown & Stenner, 2001; Clough, 
2007; Massumi, 1996; Thrift, 2004). As with any new or re-emerging theoretical 
arena that promises so much some careful exploration of its potential utility is 
required. These need to be empirically sensitive, speaking to and for our individual 
disciplinary concerns. 
 
In this paper I will explore theories of affect with regard to embodiment, and what 
they may offer for theories of embodiment. Moreover it is a concern with specific 
bodies that is of interest, namely the psychiatrically medicated bodies of mental health 
service users (hereafter referred to as ‘service users’). Managing medication, as the 
primary treatment for mental distress, can be a major part of everyday living as a 
community mental health service user (given the range of effects it can have on one’s 
body) (Breggin, 1993; Lacey & Woodward, 1985; Rogers et al., 1993; Tucker, 2006). 
Additionally medicated bodies are produced through a number of inter-relating forces. 
Firstly as part of the psychiatric system that has the power to designate that someone 
should be treated with medication if deemed appropriate when a person enters the 
psychiatric system. Additionally biochemical changes that medication effect, and 
finally how these translate into psychological experience. Service users, whose 
psychological experiences are bound up in the material activity of their bodies, can 
face a challenging interpretative task in making sense of their bodies at such times. 
Theories of affect, posited as valuable ways of conceptualising the complex relations 
between social, psychological and material forces, are potentially useful ways to 
explore the medicated bodies of service users. The issue of how we, as social 
scientists, go about analysing such experiences, is an important question. I will begin 
with unpicking the most pronounced relationship associated with affect, namely with 
emotion. Returning to the work of Baruch Spinoza will provide a valuable foundation 
for gaining insight into future engagements with affect. A theoretical journey will 
then take in Deleuze and Guattari and Brian Massumi, before working towards an 
empirical engagement (with some theoretical assistance from Michel Serres) with 
embodiment that allows a level of specificity to develop that speaks to the concrete 
reality of living on long-term psychiatric medication. 
 
Affect(s) and/of Spinoza, Deleuze & Guattari, and Massumi 
 
The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity 
is increased or diminished (Spinoza, 1996: 129) 
 
Whereas modern psychology frames affects as forms of emotion, and consequently as 
cognitively situated internal drivers of action, Spinoza was always concerned with 
relations between bodies, not affects as cognitively reducible entities. He understood 
bodies as intrinsically linked to other bodies, and individual bodily actions as 
produced in concert with the actions of other bodies. Indeed, relations with other 
bodies either increased or decreased one’s own bodily actions. For Spinoza affects 
refer to the relations between bodies and the ‘affects’ of these relations. Power is a 
central constituent of these relations. The effects of bodies on other bodies either 
increases or decreases their power to act. For example, giving a person a sedative 
could reduce power to act in one sense, through inducing sleep. But it could increase 
power in another sense, namely by increasing post-sleep activity levels.  
Spinoza’s affective model also emphasises movement. In talking about bodies acting 
on other bodies, he was not pointing to bodies as stable entities, but rather as products 
of ongoing relations with others; “..the motion and rest of a body must arise from 
another body” (Spinoza, 1996: 130). A sense of fluidity and dynamism is added to the 
notion of relational embodiment. Additionally a parallel ongoing set of relations is 
posited, those referring to ‘mindful’ as opposed to ‘bodily’ activities. Whereas 
modern cognitive psychology has emotions as mental entities, for Spinoza only part 
of what he believed is emotional was constituted as ‘mindful’. Activities of the mind 
were said to operate in parallel with those of the body. These Spinoza called the 
‘ideas’ of affect, or ‘passions’. Although, not all bodily affects had a corresponding 
idea (a link is seen here with later notions of the ‘selectivity’ of consciousness that 
feature for Bergson, and Deleuze and Guattari).  
Affect, for Deleuze and Guattari (1987; 1994), was a way of considering the relational 
production of bodies and spaces. Clearly owing a debt to Spinoza they worked this 
into a long-standing orientation to conceptualising experience as only in part formed 
in and through subjects. Indeed, they were interested in the production of subjects, but 
only as one part of an ongoing stream of experience (not all reducible to what we take 
as human activity). In doing this they move from specific discussion of a Spinozist 
ontology of bodies towards a broader ontology of being. Interestingly they do not 
often mention the term ‘affect’ directly, but it operates as a driving force of so much 
of their ontology of creation. Affect is used by Deleuze and Guattari as a conception 
of the ongoing fluid flux-like life process of relational being. This is the stage that it 
enters into and becomes a key part of their creative ontology. They see life as 
constantly being made and remade, or ‘becoming’. Concepts of ‘movement’, 
‘process’ and ‘fluidity’ come to the fore. Bodies are seen as products of ongoing 
relations of force, rather than stable products. Organised through multiple sets of 
relations between bodies, objects, knowledge and language. Affects, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, are the means by which possibilities for actions are regulated, increased or 
diminished, through connections with other bodies.  
To focus on medicated bodies of service users at this stage would be to consider their 
bodies as ongoing products of relational forces that work in ways that regulate 
somatic activity. This would appear to make some sense, if medication is taken as a 
‘body’, which interacts with service users’ physiology in such a way that regulates 
their ongoing bodily activity (e.g. by decreasing mental distress, or increasing somatic 
distress through unwanted effects). This would appear a quite straightforward model 
of bodies controlled by the power of psychiatric services to administer medication and 
the subsequent effects of it. Indeed, a considerable amount of literature is concerned 
to point to the multiple power relations emerging from the privileged position of 
psychiatry over service users’ lives (Goffman, 1961; Healy, 1997; Jones, 1993; Laing, 
1969; Newnes, Holmes, & Dunn, 1999; Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin, & 
Stowell-Smith, 1995; Rogers, Pilgrim, & Lacey, 1993). What is missed conceptually 
in such an account is a notion of change, how power relations can alter, reconfigure 
according to changes in other parts of the object under focus (e.g. nuances of 
individual medication taking practices). Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is 
potentially useful here. They argue that things do not remain as they are, a notion of 
virtuality (or potential for change) is ever present.  
Deleuze and Guattari develop their own conceptual thought around creativity. Arising 
with this ontological framing is a two-form model of experience. Firstly that which 
we are consciously aware of, relations that form our ‘realities’. Secondly, a realm of 
ineffability, or reserve, from which new previously unrealised (or actualised) relations 
can be formed. This second form is the realm of difference, which drives experience, 
and as such incorporates the potential for change. One sees similarities with other 
dualistic formulations. For instance, Kant’s transcendental kinds or Plato’s forms. The 
difference for Deleuze and Guattari is that their second realm does not exist distinctly 
from the first. It actually exists in parallel with it, as a ‘virtual’ realm. The notion of 
virtuality owes much to Bergson, whose own concerns about the problems of memory 
and time led him to develop theories that espoused the selective and non-linear 
production of memory and ‘duration’. Deleuze was heavily influenced by Bergson 
(1988) and the notion of virtuality formed a key thread of his creative ontology. 
Affect, according to this model, is used as the glue that holds the known, or ‘actual’ 
realm together with the unknown but potentialised ‘virtual’. It is here that affect takes 
a more leading role in Deleuze-Guattarian ontology than in the places where the 
production of embodiment is concerned. Affect operates as a driving force, framing 
the meeting and parallel existence of two multiplicities, through which experience and 
life ‘flow and become’. Whereas Bergson talked of memory and time, and Spinoza of 
bodies, affect, for Deleuze and Guattari formed a more central part of their overall 
ontology. 
 
Affects ‘inside’ the body 
In Cultural Studies Brian Massumi has been pivotal in pulling these ideas together, 
and drawing out affect as a central strand in the Spinoza-Bergson-Deleuze trajectory. 
In Parables for the Virtual he draws on contemporary neuroscience to evidence the 
claim as to excessive (virtual) experience, or a realm that is beyond actualisation. An 
experiment concerning conscious registering of bodily activity (finger flexing) 
suggested a half-second gap between bodily activity (the finger flex) and conscious 
awareness of this. For Massumi this suggests that rather than bodily activity following 
conscious decision-making (we decide to flex out finger and it subsequently does), 
consciousness follows somatic activity. Not only follows, but is produced through a 
process of selection. We only become consciously aware of a selection of potential 
relations/experiences. Massumi states: 
…the half second is missed not because it is empty, but because it is overfull, 
in excess of the actually-performed action and of its ascribed meaning. Will 
and consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative, derived functions that 
reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed (2002: 29) 
Here ontology informs epistemology. As ontology of affect as two-sided, with bodies 
made up of actualised and virtualised formations, and knowledge framed as only 
possible through actualisation. What come to be known are actualised forms. 
Moreover, the uploading of somatic information to consciousness, which becomes 
conscious knowledge, is partial. Certain bodily activity will not register as conscious 
awareness (e.g. nail growth). Consequently for Massumi, we can only partially know 
our bodies.  
The distinctions that exist between conscious and non-conscious affects, the 
autonomic somatic responses, like the blink of an eyelid or skin response, belie the 
existence of autonomic activity that is non-conscious. This ‘excessive’ model of 
experience is a technologically derived account of affective activity. One would not 
be able to make inferences about such autonomic activity without the contemporary 
technologies available to us. Clough (2007) takes this up in engaging with the 
biomediated body, in which she is interested in developing a contemporary politically 
relevant idea of how bodies are produced through complex relations of technology, 
culture and biology, whilst remaining irreducible to any particular one. Here virtuality 
exists in the realm of unknowable bodily activity, with affect framed as the link 
between consciousness and non-consciousness. The question raised is how does this 
process work in relation to psychiatrically medicated bodies? 
With regard to mental health service users taking medication, the relation between 
service user bodies and medication would only be partial according to Massumi. They 
may only come to ‘know’ the formation of certain somatic states. Consequently 
understanding and analysing service users bodies, and how they come to interpret and 
communicate them is difficult. In Spinozist terms service users’ bodies are understood 
as produced through ongoing relations that can both increase and decrease their power 
to act. A number of relations feature in producing their ongoing activity levels. 
Primary amongst them is psychiatric medication. This power relation is administered 
as part of a person entering the psychiatric service system due to experiencing mental 
distress and subsequently receiving medication as treatment. This happens extensively 
due to the predominance of medication in psychiatric treatment (Rogers et al., 1998). 
Through consultation with a psychiatrist the level and type of medication will be 
decided and administered1
Whilst the initial administration of medication can be a relatively straightforward 
process, the impact it can have on daily bodily activity can be quite complex, and 
marked. Psychiatric medication can have a series of effects on service users’ bodies. 
One or more of these will be the ‘main’ effects, aimed at lessening the levels of 
mental distress. The other effects can be wide-ranging and diverse. For instance, 
increased appetite, constipation, loss of libido, restlessness, somnolence, infertility, 
pain, the list could continue. Not everyone will experience these so called ‘side 
effects’, and even if experienced the severity and breadth of effects felt will be 
variable. Nonetheless, for some, living with a medicated body can be a considerable 
challenge. For social scientists addressing medicated bodies, what remains unclear are 
the somatic processes through which service users notice and act upon the effects of 
taking medication. How do some effects come to be associated with medication, and 
how are such states identified and communicated? 
.  
By way of some empirical examples I would now like to consider extracts from 
interviews with mental health service users about their psychiatric medication 
regimens, and the kinds of somatic challenges produced therein. The extracts that 
follow are taken from a project exploring challenges of living on long-term 
medication for community service users. This project was conducted between 2004-
2006 in the East Midlands area of the United Kingdom, and involved semi-structured 
interviews with community based service users who attended day centres run by a 
national charity in the UK. Interviews included discussing in detail service users’ 
experiences of psychiatric treatments, particularly medication. This involved talking 
about the different kinds of medication taken, how frequently and in what dosage, and 
effects thereof. The following extract is from an interview with Beatrice2
 
, a female 
service user who has experienced several severe psychotic episodes and received 
medication for a number of years, talks about an episode in which her medication was 
causing her problems: 
Beatrice: so (I:  mm) so badly (I:  mm) (.) I was (.) restless (.) I couldn’t 
sit still (2) it was awful the pains were in my legs so (.) I thought, I told my 
key worker (.) and she says “I don’t know what it could be” (.) and um the (.) I 
                                                 
1 This is a slightly simplified account of the process of administration of psychiatric 
medication for service users. Such processes depend on in-depth ongoing risk 
assessments, and vary according to whether care is in-patient or community based. 
Additionally medication can be self-administered (tablet form), or by mental health 
professional via depot injection. This paper focuses on people living in the 
community who self-administer tablet forms of medication.  
2 Pseudonyms are used throughout to protect service users’ identities.  
think she told my doctor (.) but nothing was happening I (.) so I thought I’m 
not taking this anymore (.) taking this medication anymore (.) and (.) that’s 
where it all started where (.) I became ill again 
In this extract Beatrice is recalling a time in which she stopped taking her medication. 
The preceding factors that led to her ceasing medication were named as restlessness 
and pain in her legs. These affective states were not directly visible externally, as 
other people cannot see pain, it is a sensory phenomena, although it can manifest itself 
in general restlessness that others can observe. Nevertheless it is a term with 
considerable cultural capital in terms of communicating a problem with one’s body. 
Indeed Beatrice’s key worker acknowledges the problem, but is reported as not 
deciphering the pain in relation to the medication Beatrice was taking. This leads 
Beatrice to take matters in to her own hands, by ceasing taking her medication, which 
becomes a problematic strategy as it leads to a reoccurrence of mental distress (“I 
became ill again”). 
How to begin to understand how this state is produced, made up of biochemical 
reactions within Beatrice’s body, and how these come to be known and interpreted, 
and subsequently communicated? A number of factors are involved, all of which 
potentially reconfigure Beatrice’s somatic state at that time. There are the biochemical 
forces of the medication entering and altering Beatrice’s body, the subsequent feelings 
that enter consciousness, the translating of sensation into language, and 
communication to the Key Worker. Could we turn to biology to solve these 
questions? May be a language of biochemistry (e.g. medication reducing dopamine 
activity in the brain) can explain the multiple somatic productions of medicated 
bodies. Biophilosophy, for Eugene Thacker (2005), thinks not, and has concerned 
itself to move away from traditional ideas of thinking what bodies are, or how 
biological life exists in stable forms, be it genetic and/or biochemical, towards 
thinking bodies as multiple and dynamic. Rather than think of how bodies are formed, 
it focuses on changing bodies, creating and inventing new ways of doing bodies. As 
Thacker states: 
It abandons the concept of ‘life itself’ that is forever caught between the poles 
of nature and culture, biology and technology, human and machine. Instead it 
develops concepts that always cut across and that form networks: the 
molecular, multiplicity, becoming-animal, life-resistance (Thacker, 2005) 
This Deleuzian take pushes the epistemological activity of philosophy of biology into 
the realm of ontology (Thacker, 2005). Refiguring bodies as non-boundaried elements 
of ongoing power relations coheres with what Annmarie Mol (2002) calls the 
‘enactment’ of bodies, where bodies are taken as existing only within the practices 
through which they are performed. Accordingly, the ongoing production of bodies 
requires incorporation of the constituent parts of the ‘producing network’ of the 
medicated bodies of service users. A useful starting point for such an analysis would 
be attending to the published ‘side effects’ of the psychiatric medications taken. This 
would provide details of the kinds of somatic experience that could occur. However, 
the reactions, or affects produced by medication taking are variable. One cannot 
assume service users will experience any or all of the same kinds of reactions. The 
best that could be hoped for would be a framework of possible affects, somewhere 
within which individual responses could be mapped. This would be like a form of 
network mapping, allowing patterns to be developed across a corpus of users. A form 
of medication affective map, with patterning of somatic states enacted. Such a factor 
though would not allow for the relation of possible effects of one medication to be 
mapped with others. Service users often take several different types of medication. 
For instance, an anti-psychotic, anticholinergic (to help lessen so called ‘side effects’ 
of antipsychotic medication), antidepressants and medication for other non-
psychiatric conditions.  
A more ‘visible’ example of the production of a medicated body can be seen in the 
following extract with Janine: 
Janine:  Yes, I have tablets, yes, and I had the worst tablets that I have 
ever had because one of them, I forget which one it was no, used to send my 
eyes up like that and you are looking up like that and you could not bring your 
eyes down, it was so embarrassing when you were out anywhere, you know, 
you would be like this, you know, (laughs). 
Janine’s account points to a medication that produced a very noticeable somatic state, 
which was clearly visible to others. She reports that on taking the medication her eyes 
would roll back in her head, seemingly involuntarily. Such a phenomenon, existing on 
the perceived boundary between internality and externality (i.e. the surface of the 
body), was clearly visible to others, which presented quite a problem for Janine (“it 
was so embarrassing”). Looking back on the occasion brings some humour to the 
experience for Janine, and she laughs as she recalls the apparent unusualness of that 
particular somatic information. Here the uploading of sensation into consciousness is 
somewhat forced. The explicit visibility of the effects of medication is such that 
conscious awareness follows. In such cases interpretation and communication are 
reasonably simple.  
The extracts of Beatrice and Janine were understood, interpreted and communicated 
by them reasonably straightforwardly. The formation of medicated bodies can be 
much more challenging. Particularly tricky for theoretical interpretation are times in 
which bodily affective states change. Although the notion of affect drawn upon here is 
one of movement and process, bodies as products of flow, and consequently not 
continually stable, levels of change are variable. The extent of change and difference 
varies, in terms of service users’ bodies moments of pronounced change can occur 
when new medication regimens begin. Such changes can occur for a number of 
reasons. For instance, a change in medication, or amount of specific medication taken, 
or a new combination of medications. One of the problems facing social scientific 
theories of affect is how to grasp the slippery ongoing fluid processes that are of 
interest. Bodies are continually made and remade. Indeed, they are constantly being 
made. Stepping up to try to gain analytic purchase in this ‘stream’ is difficult. One 
approach is to draw attention to moments of change, or ‘events’. Times when 
relations deviate from previous patterns and reconfigure, losing connections with 
previous relations and forming new ones. Additionally we need an approach that is 
not only a ‘social studies of biology’ approach (as some recent moves to consider the 
relation between society and biology have been (Rose, 2007)), but that actually 
theoretically highlights the coming together and infolding of multiple relations within 
bodies, that in turn, constitute the ontology of the bodies under focus.  
One potential way forward with an approach towards conceptualising medicated 
bodies as informed by affect theory is to consider the body as a system of 
communication. This might seem quite a rich metaphor, but here a specific notion of 
somatic communication, taken from Michel Serres, is formulated. If we follow 
Massumi’s conviction of the actual/virtual model, in which a realm of potential runs 
alongside, although not ontologically distinct from, that which comes to be, we should 
consider the body as an open system, or network, of producing inter-relations. How 
do the constitute parts communicate with one another? Many of the messages bodies 
send exist outside of conscious awareness. There are many constituent parts of this 
system of communication; biological, technological (in the form of medication), 
social, psychological, and their multiple inter-relations. Whilst Massumi points to 
autonomic affects as those produced by the autonomic system, and not directly 
accessible to consciousness, the inter-relation of biology and medication can produce 
affective states that are not directly part of the autonomic nervous system, but 
nevertheless are not retained or accessible by consciousness.  
 
Learning to be affected 
The first part of this process is the registering and deciphering of embodied 
information. With Beatrice and Janine this was relatively straightforward, through 
commonly used terms to describe problematic somatic states (i.e. pain), and affective 
states that are externally visible (i.e. eyes rolling back). It’s a question of listening to 
what our bodies tell us.  Or as Serres (1982) puts it, having ‘special listening devices’ 
to listen to the noise and signals of the body. For Serres, bodies produce massive 
amounts of information that are constituted across many levels. He gives the example 
of a Russian Doll in considering the integrative nature of a set of inter-locking levels, 
which in bodies, are made up of multiple biochemical and molecular activity. On each 
level the chemical activity produces background noise, which is produced as excess 
from the molecular business occurring. Noise is the unwanted interference (such as 
the crackling of a radio). Neighbouring levels in the hierarchy of levels subsequently 
receive both the signal of the molecular activity and the background noise. The 
information-noise couplet is loaded up to the next level, and so on, with consequent 
increased complexity. Serres sees this unwanted interference, partially masking the 
main signal, as key to understanding bodies. Rather than an undesired extra, it is the 
most interesting feature. To understand and make sense of this inter-locking system of 
increased somatic information we need a ‘special listening device’ for Serres, namely 
sensation.  
Accordingly we can make sense of the mass of somatic information and noise 
produced by our bodies through sensing (or feeling) it. For Massumi though, not all 
somato-affective states are sensible. Or at least not all are directly decipherable in 
consciousness (e.g. autonomic nervous system activity). So, somatic information-
noise can exist that is not always consciously perceptible. It is straightforward to 
imagine that bodies are constantly producing information-noise through their ongoing 
activity of being-bodies (e.g. digestion, cell regeneration, hair growth). For the most 
part, this activity is non-conscious, unless a problem is experienced in the system (e.g. 
food poisoning), when somatic information becomes very ‘loud’. For Serres: 
We are submerged to our neck, to our eyes, to our hair, in a furiously raging 
ocean. We are the voice of this hurricane, this thermal howl, and we do not 
even know it. It exists but it goes unperceived. The attempt to understand this 
blindness, this deafness, or, as is often said, this unconsciousness thus seems 
of value to me. We have eyes in order not to see ourselves, ears in order not to 
hear ourselves. The observer observes nothing, or almost nothing. (1982: 77) 
Analysing the production of medicated bodies requires consideration of the process of  
‘hearing’ our bodies, and how such information may be communicated. Experiencing 
negative somatic effects from medication can be moments when information becomes 
very ‘loud’. This can occur through both visible and invisible information, where 
somatic information is observable by others, or only known from ‘within’. 
Somatic Communication(s) 
The earlier extracts of Beatrice and Janine provided examples of quite distinct 
actualised affective states being produced. They pointed to processes of bodies 
communicating to their ‘owner’, and the subsequent communication of negative 
somatic experience to others (e.g. the key worker). Affect as the link between virtual 
and actual is reasonable easily communicated. The actualised affect state is pain, a 
commonly experienced sensation, easily recognised and consequently features as part 
of the register of conscious knowledge we have about our bodies. Affective states 
produced by medication were relatively easily translated and captured into actualised 
communicable meanings, either verbally (reporting the pain) or somatically (eyes 
rolling back). In the final extract I would like to explore a more protracted period of 
change between two different medications, and the process of trying to interpret 
(‘know’) and communicate such somatic experiences:  
 
Michael:….. I can’t remember the first one, I think it might have been ….. the 
second one I was on Doxyfene for umpteen years and last year, just before I 
went to the first counselling they said they don’t make Doxyfene ….. that was 
the GP I told you about, I sent in my repeat prescription to the doctors, got to 
the chemist to pick my stuff up, problem, we have only got a fortnights supply 
of Doxyfene and this particular doctor was not my usual doctor and he said 
“when doctor so and so is back from holiday next week, make an appointment 
to see him so he can prescribe something that is suitable.”  So luckily I saw the 
better doctor and he changed me onto ….. so that was a bit scary coming off 
one, trying to wean off one and go on another ….. as I gradually reduced the 
dosage I was feeling very weird for that week and then it took about another 
week or so, ten days for the other medication to start taking effect. 
Ian: Can you kind of explain what this kind of weirdness was? 
Michael: Well anxiety I think, definitely anxiety and ….. feeling 
nervous, anxious, scared I suppose is the word and then my eyes were playing 
a few tricks and things like that, losing my temper, very irritable, blowing up 
at people, not sleeping, not feeling well, feeling depressed, feeling down.  In 
fact I started taking sleeping tablets that week for the whole week to try and 
get to sleep to see if it would get better.   
With Michael we see the concentration of new affective states being produced, 
challenges of managing one’s body in relation to changes, and the problem of 
adequately communicating changes. Michael discusses the change from one 
medication to another as a transition process, which was “quite scary” and made him 
feel “weird”. The use of ‘weird’ is noteworthy as it suggests some form of non-
specified difference, unusualness, with negative overtones. It also points to the 
trickiness of capturing changing affective states in actualised socio-linguistic 
frameworks. It is difficult to make sense of this, and additionally to report on it. Not 
only to interpret somatic messages that may or may not register in actualised 
conscious states, but also to attempt to find the language through which to 
communicate their existence to others. When I ask Michael to expand on what he 
means by ‘weird’ we see an array of offerings attempting to capture the changing 
affective states.  
The theoretical approach of Massumi, with the addition of Serres, potentially provides 
a lens through which to analyse the production of, and challenges of interpretation and 
communicating the medicated bodies under focus. Whilst in the previous extracts of 
Beatrice and Janine, in which the progression of information-noise through levels to 
reach consciousness was quite straightforward, due to the clarity and ‘loudness’ of the 
message (eyes rolling back, leg pain), for Michael this is a more complex process. 
The information and noise is more complicated, as there is more of it. Additionally 
this points to a transition from actualised state to (re)actualised affective state, with 
the middle part involving a period in which Michael’s body is unmoored and cast off 
to a virtual period of change. His attempts to get a meaningful foothold in this 
(re)affecting system are troubled by the mass of ‘loud’ information, and he casts a 
wide net in trying to actualise it (anxiety, depression, not sleeping, feeling down, eyes 
playing tricks). By definition this is a difficult task, due to the production in his body 
of ‘new’ affective states, for which he has no past register of actualised experiences to 
draw upon to name them, for purposes of communication, but also to help him cope 
during the transition phase.  
The transitional features of non-specified visual experiences, temper loss, 
aggressiveness, depression and somnolence provide a challenge for Michael. On the 
one hand he faces a shifting array of affective states emerging, changing and 
disappearing. These make his body at these times a site of uncertainty and fragility. 
Unsurety as to what may emerge from such a period exacerbates through production 
of associated depression and anxiety. Michael almost becomes a ‘somatic passenger’ 
during that period as his affective state(s) were largely out of his control. Indeed all he 
could do was attempt some form of intervention to try to gain some controlling 
purchase in the wave of affective newness by taking some sleeping tablets, in the 
hope that sleep would improve his physical well being, before the new medication 
started taking effect (or producing new affects).  
Moreover, the extracts point to the importance of listening to, however difficult that 
may be, the ‘noise’ of the bodies affected by the medication. In psychiatric terms the 
primary information that should be communicated by medication is a reduction in 
mental distress (e.g. the experience of hearing voices). For some service users the 
‘noise’ produced by the range of extra effects medication can have (or ‘side effects’) 
becomes the primary concern. For Serres noise is not secondary to information, but is 
actually privileged over it. For service users interpreting, communicating, and 
managing ‘noisy’ bodies can be a central feature of everyday life.  
The primary source of noise is within the body, whose subliminal murmur our 
proprioceptive ear sometimes strains to hear: billions of cells dedicated to 
biochemical reactions, the likes of which should have us fainting from the 
pressure of their collective hum. As a matter of fact, we do sometimes hear it, 
and we call that audibility illness. The hubbub spreads across the nested levels 
of integration that form a black box full of black boxes – molecules, cells, 
organs, systems – and gradually, over boundaries and through twists and turns, 
resolves into information. Through this succession of rectifiers thrown up by 
the complexity of black boxes, it ends up as a healthy silence, and no doubt 
also as language (Serres, 2008: 106)  
For Serres bodies are systems of noise, although for the most part this noise is 
inaudible. It is only when problems occur (what Serres calls illness) that the body 
becomes audible. Although very noisy the biochemical activity of the body goes 
largely unheard by consciousness for the most part. The process of hearing one’s body 
refers primarily to periods when something changes, a maladaptation. This is similar 
to Massumi’s notion of virtual-actual, in which virtual states remain unconscious and 
only actualised forms enter conscious knowledge.  
Multiple Specificities and Affect 
An approach to affect that emphasises the virtual side to experience in relation to 
embodiment is a valuable resource for exploring medicated bodies. This draws on 
wider philosophies of embodiment that argue that bodies are formed as processes, not 
stable entities. We have seen though that in itself, the actual/virtual idea, with affect 
as the link, cannot speak to the inevitable complexity of specific bodies, namely the 
medicated bodies seen in the extracts. Virtuality brings with it ineffability, which 
whilst featuring a realm of potential difference, in terms of embodiment renders 
certain somatic experience unknowable. Understanding medicated bodies in terms of 
affect as the communicating element between virtual and actual leaves too much to be 
explained. For instance, how does the process of virtual to actual occur, how do 
service users gain knowledge of their bodies, and what are the challenges facing them 
in doing so? Here Serres’ discussion of bodies as communicative systems is a useful 
aid. The loading of sensory phenomena into consciousness can be framed as occurring 
through moving through successive levels to consciousness. Moreover, the traditional 
view of medication as designed to lessen mindful phenomena, is seen as secondary to 
attempts to manage the ‘noise’ of the variety of ‘extra’ somatic effects medication can 
have. Serres notion that noise precedes information captures this well. The potential 
utility of Serres’ thought in relation to theories of affect has been valuably argued for 
by Stenner (2004; 2006), particular his concept of the parasite as a means to point to 
the transformative nature of systems of emotion (i.e. psychological, biological and 
social), and how emotions work as spaces of communication through which different 
systems enter and continuously morph, which Stenner terms ‘paralogic’. I would like 
to offer the current paper as a further (specific) offering of a communicating system of 
affect informed by Serrian philosophy.  
Theories of affect, or turns to affect, have proved to be the low-hanging fruits of 
promise in the social sciences in recent times. Offerings that take as central to 
theoretical innovation notions of multiplicity and fluidity have much to give to our 
multiple considerations of bodies and activity in ever changing political and cultural 
environments. The challenge facing them, as with any emerging theoretical buzzword 
that borderlines on ubiquity (as ‘discourse’ has in the past) is that of attempting to 
offer an over-arching generalised theory attempting to account for the fractured, 
multiple, and chaotic worlds in which we live. As Serres notes ‘the global does not 
necessarily produce a local equivalent, and the local itself contains a law that does not 
always and everywhere reproduce the global’ (1982: 75). Theories of affect may take 
us further down our theoretical journey, but do not in themselves offer some kind of 
all encompassing conceptual framework which can easily be mapped on to our 
particular empirical questions. What we need are empirical-theoretical approaches 
that speak to specificity, not generalisability.  
In the case of service users approaching their bodies as complex productions of 
multiple information and noise can point to the challenges facing them in everyday 
life. Importantly, it is not all service user bodies that are focused on, only particular 
ones, as the production of different medicated bodies is going to be multiple and 
diverse. In the examples in this paper, we have seen instances of the deciphering of 
somatic information, when it is ‘loud’ and visible or easily captured according to 
actualised forms of knowledge (e.g. pain). Also, periods of ‘virtual’ bodies, or 
transitions of newness when previously inexperienced affective states are produced. 
These events provide a two-pronged challenge to service users. Firstly, in terms of 
deciphering affective-somatic information-noise, and secondly attempting to 
communicate it. Attempts at intervening can be made, but for some, it’s more the case 
of ‘riding the wave’ of changing bodies during those periods, waiting for more stable 
(although not necessarily completely stable) affective states to be produced. For social 
scientists analysing such phenomena we need tailored empirical and theoretical 
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